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JUSTICE STEVENS, RELIGIOUS ENTHUSIAST
Andrew Koppelman
ABSTRACT—It is sometimes alleged that Justice John Paul Stevens is
hostile to religion. In fact, however, Justice Stevens espouses a position
with religious roots and enthusiastically embraces a distinct conception of
religion. This casts doubt on the claim, made in different ways by Eduardo
Peñalver and Christopher Eisgruber, that the fundamental concern of Justice
Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence is equality. At least as important to
him is protecting religion from corruption by the state.
To be consistent, Justice Stevens ought to acknowledge, more
forthrightly than he does, that he treats religion as a distinctive human good.
Any notion of corruption implies a norm or ideal state from which the
corruption is a falling off. An invocation of the corruption rationale
presupposes that religion is a good thing deserving of protection. To call
this view hostile to religion is confused to the point of perversity.
AUTHOR—John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political
Science, Northwestern University. Thanks to Diane Amann and Thomas
Berg for helpful comments, to Marcia Lehr for research assistance, and to
Justice Stevens for laughing at the title. This is the first piece I’ve written
closely reading Justice Stevens’s work, but I have also written a book that
defends and elaborates upon one of his dissenting opinions.†

†

See ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? HOW
(2009).
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The often-repeated allegation that Justice John Paul Stevens is hostile
to religion1 has been authoritatively debunked in a pair of fine essays by
Eduardo Peñalver and Christopher Eisgruber.2 Here, I supplement their
analyses in three ways. First, I will push their claims even further and show
that Justice Stevens espouses a position that, in its own way, has religious
roots and enthusiastically embraces a distinct conception of religion.
Second, I will argue that Stevens’s religion-friendliness casts doubt on their
conclusion that his fundamental concern is equality. At least as important to
him is protecting religion from corruption by the state. Finally, I will argue
that to be consistent, Justice Stevens ought to acknowledge, more
forthrightly than he does, that he treats religion as a distinctive human good.
I. HOSTILITY TO RELIGION?
Begin by contrasting Stevens with his colleague, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who worries about the hostility claim and so reveals its
assumptions. In his first Establishment Clause opinion, conspicuously
parting company with Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy claimed that strict
separation of church and state “would require government in all its
multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so
to the detriment of the religious.”3 If this is right, then neutrality between
Protestantism and Catholicism is detrimental to Protestantism, neutrality
between Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism is detrimental to
Presbyterianism, and so forth. Religion yearns for the state’s embrace and

1

See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 245–48
(2010) (collecting sources that assert this claim).
2
See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal
Membership, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2006); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Treating Religion as
Speech: Justice Stevens’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2006).
3
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, dissenting from an opinion for the Court written by Justice Stevens, declared:
“The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district’s student-message program is
invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone
of the Court’s opinion; it bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.” 530 U.S. 290, 318
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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suffers detriment if it is denied.4 Justice Kennedy shifted to a less relaxed
reading of the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman, but he was still
careful to leave unresolved “questions of the definition and full scope of the
principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State
for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.”5 In a memo to
Justice Harry Blackmun explaining his refusal to delete that language from
his opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of showing that
the Court “is not expressing any hostility to religion or religious persons.”6
Justice Kennedy couples his vision of the harms of secularity with a
deeply individualistic vision of the disestablishment of religion that the
First Amendment commands. He thinks that the purpose of the ban on
“establishment of religion” is to prevent coercion of individuals—
understood broadly, as evinced by his invalidation of a graduation prayer in
Lee.7 Hence his recent majority opinion narrowly confining standing to
challenge Establishment Clause violations in Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization v. Winn.8 Unless individuals are demonstrably being
hurt, Justice Kennedy seems to think that no violation of the Establishment
Clause demands a judicial remedy.9
Justice Kennedy’s vision of disestablishment is blind to a central
purpose of the constitutional provision. That purpose also evades some of
Justice Stevens’s most sympathetic interpreters. But it has not evaded
Justice Stevens.
4

Attorney General Edwin Meese III, in his influential 1985 manifesto for originalism, took a
similar view. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 727, 729–30 (2009).
5
505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
6
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 150 (rev. ed. 2008) (quoting Justice Kennedy)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
7
The same point has been made about Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, which, she thinks, “prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s reading transforms the clause from a
prescription about institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right, a right not to feel like an
“outsider.” Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 299–300 (1987) (citing Lynch, 465 at 688
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
8
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 615–
18 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need for a “‘narrow exception’
to the rule against . . . standing”). Justice Stevens joined the dissent from the plurality opinion in Hein.
Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (declaring that the parties had standing to assert a challenge under the
Establishment Clause).
9
There is a counterstrand within Justice Kennedy’s thinking, which emphasizes the danger that
establishment will corrupt religion. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (“The First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or
prescribed by the State.”). But the individualistic theme swamps this in Justice Kennedy’s overall
conception and judicial practice.
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II. “RELIGIOUS BELIEFS WORTHY OF RESPECT”
A major impetus for strict separation between religion and the state
was the religion-protective idea that religion can be corrupted by state
support. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is
determined to keep the state away from religion. It is associated with the
most prominent early proponents of toleration and disestablishment,
including John Milton, Roger Williams, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf,
Elisha Williams, Isaac Backus, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, John
Leland, and James Madison.10 It is prominent, for example, in Justice Hugo
Black’s 1962 declaration in Engel v. Vitale, that the Establishment Clause
“stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”11 Black claims that there is
something fundamentally impious about establishment: it breaches the
“sacred” and the “holy.” It is remarkable to find such prophetic language in
the U.S. Reports but it has appeared there repeatedly,12 often in opinions
written by Justice Black, the principal architect of modern Establishment
Clause theory.13
Justice Black retired from the Court in 1971. Justice Stevens was not
appointed until 1975. But the same themes can be seen in the opinions of
Justice Stevens.14 In Wallace v. Jaffree, his first majority opinion in a
10

For a survey, see Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1849–77 (2009).
11
370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1783–
1787, at 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
12
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that one
“purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too
close an attachment to the organs of government”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of
sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer
who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the
government.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have
staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”).
13
See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1888–92 (discussing the scope of Justice Black’s involvement
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
14
And these themes are also evident in opinions that Justice Stevens joined. See, e.g., Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 643 (2007) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting with approval Justice Black’s statement in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947), that the framers thought “individual religious liberty could be
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
711–12 (2002) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the
Establishment Clause aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the specific threat is to the
primacy of the schools’ mission to educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered
precepts of their faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871–72 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens
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religion case, Justice Stevens declared that “the Court has identified the
individual’s freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the
various Clauses in the First Amendment.”15 He analogized state interference
with religion to the unconstitutional compulsion of speech. He invoked the
ideas of “individual freedom of mind” and “the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.”16 Here is the analogy:
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of
mind, so also the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is the
counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority.17

Justice Stevens made a noteworthy move, one that distanced him from
other separationists who rest their position on an abstract invocation of

and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“[G]overnment aid corrupts religion.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
243 (1997) (Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
(“[R]eligions supported by governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of
dissenters is burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Establishment Clause . . . was meant not only to protect individuals and their
republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion
from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608
(1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“The favored religion may be
compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may be
reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.”); id. at 615 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (quoting with approval Madison’s statement that “religion &
Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together” (quoting Letter from James
Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 105, 106 (P.
Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Letter from James Madison]) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 627 (quoting the same passage and citing the importance of “protecting religion from
the demeaning effects of any governmental embrace”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645
(1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a Christmas tree also works a distortion of the
Jewish religious calendar. . . . [T]he city’s erection alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a
relatively minor Jewish religious holiday . . . has the effect of promoting a Christianized version of
Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects not only the State from being
captured by the Church, but also protects the Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for
its purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409–10 (1985) (“When the state becomes enmeshed
with a given denomination in matters of religious significance . . . the freedom of even the adherents of
the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.”); Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (joining the majority) (warning that favored religions may be
“taint[ed] . . .with a corrosive secularism”).
15
472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985).
16
Id. at 51–52 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 642 (1943))) (internal quotation mark omitted).
17
Id. at 52.
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“conscience.”18 (Or, to anticipate Part III of this Essay, the invocation of
equality.) The right created by the First Amendment “to select any religious
faith or none at all,” he wrote, “derives support not only from the interest in
respecting the individual’s freedom of conscience, but also from the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free
and voluntary choice by the faithful.”19 He even went so far as to quote
expressly religious arguments made by Madison: “It is the duty of every
man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to
be acceptable to him.”20
This language, with its emphasis on the inner light rather than the
outward form, reflects that Justice Stevens is the last Protestant on the
Supreme Court. Uncorrupted religion, for Justice Stevens as much as for
Backus or Leland, consists in the liberty of the individual to seek God
unimpeded by the state. Only beliefs generated by the exercise of that
liberty are “worthy of respect.”21 This is not an uncontroversial religious
view, although it is pervasive in American law.22
Thus, although he was suspicious of some religious accommodations,
he was part of the majority in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division, which found a constitutionally significant
burden on religion when the denial of unemployment benefits put
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs.”23 But Justice Stevens’s individualism is not Justice Kennedy’s:
Justice Stevens understands that the protection of this individualistic
understanding of religion requires structural limitations on the state. He has
twice quoted with approval the following statement by Clarence Darrow:
The realm of religion . . . is where knowledge leaves off, and where faith
begins, and it never has needed the arm of the State for support, and wherever

18

For examples of such separationists, see Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity,
and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 215 n.1, 232–33 (2009).
19
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53.
20
Id. at 53 n.38 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299–301 (Saul Kussiel Padover ed.,
1953)).
21
Id. at 53.
22
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan observes that the individualistic conception excludes quite a lot of
religion: “[F]or most religious people everywhere at most times, religious leadership, and the form of
government of one’s religious community, is, in some sense, given, not chosen, and related in explicit
ways to government. Those are aspects of religion that gives it its authority and its comfort.” Winnifred
Fallers Sullivan, Requiem for the Establishment Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 310 (2008).
23
450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). Justice Stevens joined Court majorities with similar reasoning in
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989), and Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the religion that it would
pretend to serve.24

This theme appears in other Stevens opinions. His dissent in Roemer v.
Board of Public Works emphasized “the pernicious tendency of a state
subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission
without wholly abandoning it.”25 In Wolman v. Walter, he was concerned
that “sectarian schools will be under pressure to avoid textbooks which
present a religious perspective on secular subjects, so as to obtain the free
textbooks provided by the State.”26 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet, he declared that the state had
impermissibly “provided official support to cement the attachment of young
adherents to a particular faith.”27 The basis for his suspicion of judicially
imposed free exercise exemptions, he explained, was his concern that it
would place courts in “the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims.”28
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, he advocated “a strong presumption
against the display of religious symbols on public property,”29 noting the
“risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being
advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement
disrespectful.”30 He cited opponents of a state-funded crèche who “do not
countenance its use as an aid to commercialization of Christ’s birthday.”31
He quoted with approval Justice Black’s declaration in Engel that “[i]t is
neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government
in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people

24

Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Scopes v. State,
289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26
433 U.S. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27
512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring).
28
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 & n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 & n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the
passage and repeating the point).
29
492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 797, 806–07
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
30
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Van
Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 718 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
31
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 811–12 & n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance.”32
Justice Stevens’s admiring view of religion is also apparent in his
opinion for the Court in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of
Stratton.33 He declared, while protecting door-to-door religious canvassing,
that “[t]his form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under
the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the
pulpits.”34 Justice Stevens demands a high wall of separation because he
wants to protect religion from the state. As he put it in Van Orden v. Perry,
quoting Madison, “[R]eligion & [Government] will both exist in greater
purity, the less they are mixed together.”35
The same religion-protective impulse animates his advocacy of strict
separation to prevent government funding of religious activities. From
Justice Stevens’s earliest opinions to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, in which
he denounced “the use of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of
thousands of grammar school children in particular religious faiths,”36 he
argued that state funding of religion would violate the Establishment
Clause. Yet, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
he joined the majority opinion’s holding that the use of public funds for a
blind student studying for the ministry was permissible, because any aid
“that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”37 Evidently
the problem is not state funding as such. It is the potential of selective
funding to distort religious decisions. The consistent theme is not the
prevention of financial support for religion, but the protection of religion
from manipulation by the state.38
32

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 653 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
33
536 U.S. 150 (2002).
34
Id. at 160–61 (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943)).
35
545 U.S. 677, 725 n.25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Letter from James Madison, supra note 14); see also id. (“[T]here remains . . . a strong bias towards the
old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition between [Government] & Religion neither can
be duly supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a coalition, and such its corrupting influence on
both the parties, that the danger cannot be too carefully guarded [against]” (second and third alterations
in original) (quoting Letter from James Madison, supra note 14, at 105)); id. at 725 n.26 (“Religion
flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of [government].” (alteration in original) (quoting
Letter from James Madison, supra note 14) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
36
536 U.S. 639, 684–85 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
474 U.S. 481, 487–88 (1986).
38
Justice Stevens has one blind spot in this area. William Cavanaugh argues persuasively that the
distinction between religion, understood as a distinctively unstable and dangerous set of beliefs, and
patriotism, imagined as a stabilizing and valid reason to kill and die, is part of the legitimizing
mythology of the modern state. See WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 192
(2009). Under that ideology, the state itself becomes a sacralized object that elicits its own form of
idolatry. This argument sheds unflattering light on Justice Stevens’s willingness to relax the protections
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III. THE EQUALITY INTERPRETATION
Peñalver has shown that the pattern of Justice Stevens’s religion clause
decisions—siding with the liberals on Establishment Clause questions in
invalidating public funding of religion and public religious expression while
voting with the conservatives in rejecting free exercise-based exemption
claims—is not motivated by hostility to religion. Rather, Peñalver claims
that the decisions are animated by a distinctive perspective that holds that
religious majorities are uniquely dangerous and religious minorities are
uniquely vulnerable:
Judicial intervention in defense of religion is . . . appropriate, on Justice
Stevens’s view, principally in situations in which the Court thinks it likely that
a religious group (or believer) is being unfairly singled out for unequal
treatment or where some sub-category of religious groups (or believers) are
particularly vulnerable to state coercion.39

Special benefits for religion raise Justice Stevens’s suspicions when they
benefit majorities, but such benefits for unusually vulnerable groups do not
violate the Establishment Clause.
Eisgruber similarly observes that Justice Stevens is most likely to
intervene on behalf of free exercise claims when a religious minority has
received unusually unfavorable treatment at the hands of the state, and from
this infers that his central concern is equal membership in society.40 The
central problem with establishment, according to Eisgruber, is that it
signifies second-class citizenship for members of minority religions. He is
more enthusiastic than Peñalver about this theme, but both are confident
that it is Justice Stevens’s predominant concern in religion clause
adjudication.
Peñalver and Eisgruber are, I believe, correct in thinking that equality
is one central concern of Justice Stevens.41 But neither of them recognizes
the difficulties of putting this concern directly into practice. Both neglect
the importance, to Justice Stevens and to Establishment Clause law more
generally, of the corruption concern.
It is true that the pattern of Justice Stevens’s decisions is one of
protecting religious minorities. But is that the result he is aiming for, and
of free speech in order to permit the state to criminalize the desecration of an American flag. See United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319–24 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 436–39 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39
Peñalver, supra note 2, at 2247.
40
Eisgruber, supra note 2, passim.
41
Diane Marie Amann notes Justice Stevens’s early encounters with anti-Jewish prejudice. See
Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
885, 916–17 (2010). When Justice Stevens took his first law firm job, he wrote to his old boss, Justice
Wiley Rutledge, that the firm included several Jews, “[C]ontrary to the practice of most of the successful
outfits in Chicago.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). He later cofounded a
small firm that included a Jewish partner. Id.
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should lower courts try to replicate this pattern? A major theme in Justice
Stevens’s religion jurisprudence, from the beginning, is the need for simple,
workable rules.42 Thomas Berg has shown that any attempt by courts to
specifically protect religious minorities presents intractable difficulties:
“Because of America’s complex patterns of religious identities, who is a
minority will often vary depending on the geographical location, on the
institutional setting in which a particular legal issue arises, and on how one
chooses the key religious differences that sort groups into different
categories.”43 The best way to protect minorities, Berg argues, is to “follow
rules structurally designed to protect whoever happens to be the minority.”44
This is, in fact, what Justice Stevens has been doing.
The most thorough attempt to work out a theory of the religion clauses
that directly operationalizes a concern with equality is the collaborative
work of Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, who claim Justice Stevens as their
champion on the Court.45 Like Justice Stevens, they think religion is
valuable but argue that it is unfair to privilege it over other, equally valuable
human activities.46 They do not always object to the legal singling out of
religion. Rather, their central claim is that such singling out is only
justifiable to protect religion from discrimination.47 Among their proof-texts
is Justice Stevens’s declaration that “[a] paramount purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to protect . . . a person from being made to feel like
an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community,”48
and his declaration that constitutionally mandatory exemptions “could be
viewed as a protection against unequal treatment rather than a grant of
favored treatment for the members of the religious sect.”49
42

See ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION 44–47 (1988).
Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 919, 923
(2004).
44
Id. A similar point can be made about religious division, which has also been a persistent concern
of Justice Stevens. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1667 (2006).
45
Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2180 (“Lawrence G. Sager and I have . . . shown how a Stevens-like
equality-based exemptions jurisprudence could lead to more robust protection for religious conduct than
the Court has ever provided.”). The theory is worked out at fullest length in their book, CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007), which
elaborates on claims made in earlier articles, see id. at 264, 266 (discussing Justice Stevens with
approval). Because some details of the argument are stated more fully in those articles, which aim at a
more specialized readership, I will draw upon them as well as the book.
46
See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 24.
47
Id. at 9, 13.
48
See Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2179 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
49
See id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))
(citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 147 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber &
43
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Instead of privilege, Eisgruber and Sager propose a principle that they
call “equal liberty.”50 Equal liberty has three components: (1) “no members
of our political community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual
foundations of their important commitments and projects,”51 (2) “aside from
this deep and important concern with discrimination, we have no
constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving special benefits or as
subject to special disabilities,”52 and (3) “citizens in general enjoy broad
space within which to pursue and act upon their most valued commitments
and projects, whether these be religious or not.”53
Privileging and protecting, however, are not analytically distinct, but
rather are logically continuous with one another. The question is not
whether, but rather what, to privilege. Once this is understood, it becomes
clear that, just like a minority protection principle, the equal liberty
principle is empty and unhelpful in resolving any actual legal question. It is
not a principle at all, but a worry about unfairness that can at best play a
useful role in influencing judgment about inescapably discretionary
decisions.
Eisgruber and Sager reject claims “that religious convictions are more
important or in some way more valuable than all others, that religious
divisions are more dangerous than all others, or that religion is uniquely
immune to political judgment and regulation.”54 But they are not Benthamite
utilitarians who think that all preferences ought to be treated the same.55
Some concerns have special urgency, religion is one of these, and it ought
not to be privileged relative to the others: “religion does not exhaust the
commitments and passions that move human beings in deep and valuable
ways.”56 The authors offer several different formulations of the criteria for
admission into this set of particularly important concerns: these are “deep”
commitments;57 religion should not be privileged “by comparison to

Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1289–90 (1994) (citing a similar point in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)).
50
In earlier work, they referred to the same principle as “equal regard”: “Equal regard requires that
the state treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard
as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.” Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1285.
In their book, they occasionally revert to the earlier term. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 13,
89–93, 96, 102, 120, 256.
51
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 52.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 245.
54
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips Off Our Block? A Reply to Berg,
Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2007).
55
For a more fully developed discussion of the contrast between their views and Bentham’s, see
Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571.
56
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1245 n.††.
57
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 87, 89, 95, 101, 197, 241, 246, 252.
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comparably serious secular commitments”;58 other concerns are equally
“important”;59 “religious practices enjoy a dignity equal to other deep
human convictions (such as the love parents feel for their children).”60
Eisgruber and Sager deny “that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a
category of human experience that demands special benefits and/or
necessitates special restrictions.”61 However, they have their own special
class. It just happens to be larger than “religion.”
Once it is stipulated that some human wants have a stronger claim than
others, the distinction between the two models, of privilege and protection,
disappears. What Eisgruber and Sager really advocate is that deep
commitments be privileged relative to shallow ones, but protected from
discrimination relative to one another.
To see how privilege and protection are intertwined, consider a
familiar rule of law: all adults and no infants may vote in elections. Under
this rule, adults A and B may vote, while infant C may not. A and B are thus
privileged relative to C. If someone proposes to deny A the right to vote—
say, because A is black or female—this is discriminatory, and A is entitled
to be protected from such a discriminatory rule. That rule would be wrong
because it would impose an equality of the wrong sort: it would treat A as if
she were (equal to) an infant. Guaranteeing the right to vote to both A and B
protects each from discrimination relative to one another, but it also
privileges both relative to C.
Thus, Eisgruber and Sager are too confident when they say, for
example, that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)62 is
unconstitutional because it singles out religion and treats it as more valuable
than some other human activities, or relieves religious people from burdens
others must bear.63
How can we know that the legislative regime of which RFRA is a part
is giving unduly little weight to nonreligious concerns? RFRA alone cannot
tell us that. We would have to know how those other concerns are in fact
treated.
Eisgruber and Sager respond that all discrimination claims face a
similar evidentiary problem: one must always find a comparator to show

58

Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1271; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 90,
101, 103, 108, 300 n.37 (“serious”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional
Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 104 (“There is no
coherent normative basis for insisting that religious commitments receive better treatment than other,
comparably serious commitments . . . .”).
59
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 6, 9, 15, 52, 95–96.
60
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 58, at 114.
61
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 6.
62
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
63
See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 264–67.
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that discrimination is occurring.64 But the real question is whether there is
an intelligible analytic distinction between privileging and protection in this
context. The difficulty is not merely evidentiary. The problem is that,
without further specification, we do not know what we are looking for
evidence of.
Professor Eisgruber declares that this vagueness is “deliberate, because
I mean the proposition to be neutral among various ways of filling out the
concept—though I do mean to insist that there exist some ‘comparably
serious and fundamental’ non-religious commitments.”65 But in order for
the principle to have any bite, it is necessary to specify what those
commitments are. Unless that is done, one cannot possibly tell whether they
are unfairly being treated less favorably than comparable religious
commitments.
Thomas Berg has shown that this is an intractable problem for
Eisgruber and Sager:
In any case involving accommodation of a religious interest, numerous other
personal commitments and interests arguably are comparable, and the
government typically accommodates some and not others.66

Eisgruber and Sager argue, for example, that, where a police department
allowed an officer to wear a beard for medical reasons, it also was
appropriately required to allow a beard for religious reasons. But the same
police department did not allow beards “to mark an ethnic identity or follow
the model of an honored father.”67 So the requirement of equal regard is
incoherent: “When some deeply-felt interests are accommodated and others
are not, it is logically impossible to treat religion equally with all of them.”68
A similar difficulty is presented by the Eisgruber- and Sager-like
position that Justice Stevens took in City of Boerne v. Flores,69 in which he
declared that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states
because it violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Stevens’s position in
this case is brief but dense and, I will argue, combines two different
arguments. The first is like that of Eisgruber and Sager: other equally
valuable commitments are being slighted in favor of religion. Justice
Stevens wrote:

64

Id. at 100–08 (responding to earlier criticisms of mine).
E-mail from Christopher L. Eisgruber, Provost & Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Pub.
Affairs, Princeton Univ., to author (July 10, 2005).
66
Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1194
(2007) (reviewing EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45).
67
Id. at 1194–95 (commenting on Eisgruber and Sager’s discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision
in Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)).
68
Id. at 1195.
69
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
65
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If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an
art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from
the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because the
landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its
owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally
applicable, neutral civil law.70

Here the trouble is that some concerns that are just as valuable as
religious ones are being discriminated against. But, as with Eisgruber and
Sager, how can we tell whether RFRA is part of a regime of unfair
privilege? Justice Stevens once cited the “overriding interest in keeping the
government⎯whether it be the legislature or the courts⎯out of the
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims” as a
reason for denying religious accommodations: “The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring
one religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was
designed to preclude.”71 Perhaps he was suggesting in Boerne that RFRA
presents precisely this danger of discrimination among religions. If it is
never permissible to single out religion for special treatment, no specifically
religious accommodation could ever be permitted. Yet this is not Justice
Stevens’s view. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, he joined a unanimous Court in
upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA)72 against an Establishment Clause challenge.73 In Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, he joined a unanimous
Court in applying RFRA to limit the reach of federal law, without a whisper
about the Establishment Clause.74 Perhaps he eventually was persuaded that
facial neutrality does not preclude religious discrimination—for example,
he did not defer to facial neutrality in the school funding cases.75 If it does
not, then preventing religious discrimination may require religion-specific
measures.76 So Justice Stevens has Establishment Clause worries, but they
do not preclude every religious accommodation. Eisgruber and Sager,
defending Justice Stevens, explain this pattern by saying that
accommodation is permissible when it aims at preventing discrimination.
Thus, “the Court’s analysis in O Centro was dominated by concerns that
could easily be rephrased in the language of equality.”77 As we have seen,
however, that standard is so malleable as to be meaningless.
70

Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
72
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
73
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
74
546 U.S. 418 (2006).
75
I owe this point to Tom Berg.
76
Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 799–802 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (making a similar point in a racial discrimination case).
77
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 266.
71
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The rest of Stevens’s Boerne concurrence raises a very different
concern:
Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute
has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can
obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is
forbidden by the First Amendment.78

Here the problem is not treating religion as a distinctive human good. It is
that the state is again interfering with religion, by favoring theism over
nontheism.79 In an earlier opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that “the
Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it does for
the adherent of a Christian faith.”80 There is a tension between this argument
and the one about singling out religion, because the protection of religion
from state interference itself singles out religion for special treatment.
This concern could be addressed by understanding “religion” at such a
high level of abstraction that it is not conflated with theism. That is, in fact,
what the Court has done in other contexts.81 Justice Stevens never took up
this possibility, but, I will argue in the next section, it is the approach most
consistent with his general religion clause jurisprudence.
The deepest difference between the Eisgruber–Sager approach and
Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence is that the former focuses on civil status,
and thus on harm to individuals, to the complete exclusion of any
distinctive concern about protecting religion as such from state control. This
can weaken the force of disestablishment.
Consider Van Orden v. Perry, a Ten Commandments display case, in
which Justice Stevens objected that the display impermissibly “places the
State at the center of a serious sectarian dispute.”82 This is because “[t]here
are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different
religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a
pious and learned observer, these differences may be of enormous religious
significance.”83 Justice Scalia (joined, in this part of his opinion, by Justices
78

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997).
In Salazar v. Buono, Justice Stevens explained that “[a] government practice violates the
Establishment Clause if it ‘either has the purpose or effect of “endorsing” religion.’” 130 S. Ct. 1803,
1832 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)).
80
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a symmetrical
concern, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If school facilities
may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to
express a belief in God must also be permitted.”).
81
See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also Andrew Koppelman, The Story of Welsh v.
United States: Elliott Welsh’s Two Religious Tests, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 293 (Richard W.
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (discussing Welsh and Seeger).
82
545 U.S. at 718–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83
Id. at 717–18 (citing Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
471, 474–76 (1998)). Similarly, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, he would have invalidated
79
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Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas) retorted, “The sectarian dispute
regarding text, if serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious
adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal
consequences (I certainly was not).”84
Justice Scalia envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which
articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be eligible for state
endorsement (and in which determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a
source of law). Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition
so long as that proposition is (or is believed by a judge unacquainted with
doctrinal niceties to be) a matter of agreement between Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam.
Justice Stevens, of course, would have none of this. But if, as
Eisgruber and Sager think, Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence is only about
equal public status,85 then Justice Scalia is right and Justice Stevens should
have been persuaded. Most citizens are not sufficiently well-schooled in
theology to know or care that the state is adjudicating a religious question.
If they don’t know about it, then it can’t adversely affect anyone’s public
status. But evidently Justice Stevens cares about more than public status.86
If Justice Stevens’s underlying concern is the protection of religion
from corruption, then equality remains a pressing concern: discrimination
among religious views is likely to produce a degraded form of public
religion. But equality does not exhaust the concerns of disestablishment.
The central concern is structural, having to do with the proper relations
between the state and religion. It is neither about coercion of individuals nor
second-class status for groups.

a state law declaring that human life begins at conception, because he regarded this as “endorsement of a
particular religious tenet.” 492 U.S. 490, 568 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
84
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 909 n.12 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). McCreary County was a companion case to Van Orden, decided
the same day.
85
See supra notes 40, 45 and accompanying text.
86
Eisgruber emphasizes that Justice Stevens has quoted with approval Justice O’Connor’s
declaration that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.” Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2179
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); see also id. (quoting
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
But Justice Stevens in fact writes that this is what the Clause requires “at the very least.” Pinette,
515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594
(1989)). This is no more his entire theory of the Clause than his declaration that the Clause, “if nothing
else, prohibits government from ‘specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ.’” Van Orden, 545 U.S. at
718 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Justice Stevens repeats this sentence in Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1828 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In both cases, he is accusing his colleagues of violating even their own cramped
interpretations of the Clause. He is not embracing those interpretations.
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IV. THE GOOD OF RELIGION?
One of the impulses that drives Justice Scalia away from Justice
Stevens is the suspicion that Justice Stevens’s views are incoherent: Justice
Stevens opposes special treatment of religion, yet sometimes supports free
exercise accommodations. “We have not yet come close to reconciling [the
requirement that government not advance religion] and our Free Exercise
cases,” Justice Scalia writes, “and typically we do not really try.”87 The
solution Justice Scalia and others have proposed would impose dramatic
limits upon the Establishment Clause. They would read the Clause only to
prohibit favoritism among monotheistic sects, while permitting states to
favor monotheistic religion over its rivals, religious and nonreligious.88 As
we just saw in our discussion of the Ten Commandments case, Justice
Kennedy, who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion in pertinent part, is tempted
by this solution.
Justice Scalia has a point. It is not logically possible for the
government both to be neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give
religion special protection. Some Justices and many commentators have
therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension with itself.
This apparent tension can be resolved in the following way. Begin with
an axiom: the Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring
religious truth. A number of considerations support this requirement that the
government keep its hands off religious doctrine. One reason why it is so
forbidden is that the state is incompetent to determine the nature of this
truth. Another, a bitter lesson of the history that produced the Establishment
Clause, is that the use of state power to resolve religious controversies is
terribly divisive and does not really resolve anything. State involvement in
religious matters has tended to oppress religious minorities. Finally, there is
the consideration that, I have shown, is a major concern for Justice Stevens:
the idea that establishment tends to corrupt religion.
These considerations mandate a kind of neutrality. The state may not
favor one religion over another.89 It also may not take a position on
contested theological propositions. The scope of neutrality that the
Establishment Clause demands has become broader as the range of
contested theological positions has increased over time. Justice Stevens
understands this. American society’s “enviable hallmark over the course of
two centuries has been the continuing expansion of religious pluralism and
tolerance.”90 The core principle, Justice Stevens has argued, is “the principle
that government must remain neutral between valid systems of belief. As

87
88
89
90

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1899–1901.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–24 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 730 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

583

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

religious pluralism has expanded, so has our acceptance of what constitutes
valid belief systems.”91
It is, however, possible, without declaring religious truth, for the state
to favor religion at a very abstract level. The Court noticed this in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock when it invalidated a law that granted a tax
exemption to theistic publications but not atheistic or agnostic
publications.92 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion, which Justice Stevens
joined, said that a targeted exemption would be appropriate for publications
that “sought to promote reflection and discussion about questions of
ultimate value and the contours of a good or meaningful life.”93 Justice
Blackmun thought it permissible for the state to favor human activity that is
specially concerned with “such matters of conscience as life and death,
good and evil, being and nonbeing, right and wrong.”94 What is
impermissible is for the state to decide that one set of answers to these
questions is the correct set.
But the state can abstain from endorsing any specification of the best
or truest religion while treating religion as such, understood very abstractly,
as valuable. That is what the state in fact does. That is how it can
accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously neutral. In
Boerne, Justice Stevens construed RFRA to discriminate in favor of theism,
but this was not the only way in which the statute could be read.95 The key
to understanding the coherence of First Amendment religion doctrine is to
grasp the specific, vaguely delimited level of abstraction at which “religion”
is understood.
CONCLUSION
What in fact unites such disparate worldviews as Christianity,
Buddhism, and Hinduism is a well-established and well-understood
semantic practice of using the term “religion” to signify them and relevantly
analogous beliefs and practices. Efforts to distill this practice into a
definition have been unavailing.96 But the common understanding of how to
use the word has turned out to be all that is needed. Courts almost never
have any difficulty in determining whether something is a religion or not.
91

Id. at 734.
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
93
Id. at 16 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
94
Id. at 27–28 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
95
Compare his reading of the statute in Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), with the Court’s very broad and inclusive reading of the religious exemption from the
military draft in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970). As noted above, Justice Stevens evidently did not read RFRA this way when he joined the
unanimous Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
See supra text accompanying notes 72–74.
96
See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1905–11.
92
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The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of
“religion” is a remarkably short one. The reference I rely on here, Words
and Phrases, is one of the standard works of American legal research, a
132-volume set collecting brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the
present. Each case discusses the contested definition of a word whose
meaning “determines rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities of the
parties.”97 Some words have received an enormous amount of attention from
the courts. Two examples, “Abandonment” and “Abuse of Discretion,”
drawn at random from the first volume of this immense compilation, each
exceed 100 pages.98 “Religion,” on the other hand, takes up less than five
pages.99 The question of what “religion” means is theoretically intractable
but, as a practical matter, barely relevant. We know it when we see it. And
when we see it, we treat it as something good.
Strong separationism is a strategy for protecting this good from
corruption by the state. Any notion of corruption, however, implies a norm
or ideal state from which the corruption is a falling off. An invocation of the
corruption rationale presupposes that religion is a good thing deserving of
protection. To call this view hostile to religion is confused to the point of
perversity.
Justice Stevens has never squarely embraced this answer to the
dilemma. Before he could be expected to do so, it would have to be
elaborated in considerably more detail than I can attempt here. But that is
another story.100

97

See Words and Phrases, in 10 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 448, 448–49 (Donna
Batten ed., 3d ed. 2011).
98
1 WORDS AND PHRASES 37–147, supp. 4–8 (West Publ’g 2007 & Supp. 2011) (Abandonment);
id. at 323–462, supp. 23–66 (Abuse of Discretion).
99
36C WEST PUBL’G, WORDS AND PHRASES 153–57, supp. 54–55 (West Publ’g 2002 & Supp.
2011) (Religion).
100
See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (forthcoming 2013)
(on file with author).
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